An efficient privacy-preserving mutual authentication scheme for secure V2V communication in vehicular Ad Hoc network by Wu, L et al.
Received February 21, 2019, accepted April 2, 2019, date of current version May 6, 2019.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2911924
An Efficient Privacy-Preserving Mutual
Authentication Scheme for Secure V2V
Communication in Vehicular
Ad Hoc Network
LIBING WU 1,2, QIANQIAN SUN1, XINPEI WANG1, JING WANG 1, SHUI YU 3,
YIFEI ZOU4, BINGYI LIU2, AND ZIKE ZHU5
1School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
2Hubei Key Laboratory of Transportation Internet of Things, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430072, China
3School of Software, University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW 2007, Australia
4Deparment of Computer Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
5School of Economics and Finance, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430072, China
Corresponding author: Libing Wu (wu@whu.edu.cn)
This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61772377, Grant 61572370, and
Grant 91746206, in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Hubei Province of China under Grant 2017CFA007, in part by the Science
and Technology Planning Project of ShenZhen under Grant JCYJ20170818112550194, and in part by the Fund of Hubei Key Laboratory
of Transportation Internet of Things under Grant WHUTIOT-2017A0011.
ABSTRACT Recent years have witnessed that the new mobility Intelligent Transportation System is
booming, especially the development of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). It brings convenience
and a good experience for drivers. Unfortunately, VANETs are suffering from potential security and
privacy issues due to the inherent openness of VANETs. In the past few years, to address security and
privacy-preserving problems, many identity-based privacy-preserving authentication schemes have been
proposed by researchers. However, we found that these schemes fail to meet the requirements of user
privacy protection and are vulnerable to attacks or have high computational complexity. Hence, we focus
on enhancing privacy-preserving via authentication and achieving better performance. In this paper, first,
we describe the vulnerabilities of the previous scheme. Furthermore, to enhance privacy protection and
achieve better performance, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving mutual authentication protocol
for secure V2V communication in VANETs. Through security analysis and comparison, we formally
demonstrate that our scheme can accomplish security goals under dynamic topographical scenario compared
with the previous scheme. Finally, the efficiency of the scheme is showed by performance evaluation.
The results of our proposed scheme are computationally efficient compared with the previously proposed
privacy-preserving authentication scheme.
INDEX TERMS VANETs, authentication, V2V, privacy-preserving, security, identity guessing attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, along with the fast growth of intelligent
transportation systems (ITSs) [1] and wireless technolo-
gies (e.g., GPRS, VLC, 5G, WiMAX and GSM), Vehicu-
lar Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) [2] become increasingly
prosperous, enabling mobile devices to enjoy convenient and
comprehensive services. As [3] pointed out, in the Internet
of things, there are different forms in different application
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Giovanni Angiulli.
fields, such as VANETs. Vehicles as mobile devices are
generally equipped with sensors (e.g., speed, acceleration,
position, rotational speed sensor), processors and wireless
communication equipment (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, OBU) to
perform all terminal perception, computation and communi-
cation tasks [4]. Vehicles can communicate and share infor-
mation with each other, since VANET is a mobile wireless
network [5]. It is envisaged that the police may demand
to require information from drivers, but drivers may pay
close attention to their own personal sensitive information
(e.g., identity, location history and movements) when they
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communicate in the VANETs environment which exists secu-
rity threats. It is possible that these valuable data may be
stolen by the adversary in the above communication process.
That’s why mobile users, researchers even governments pay
greater attention to security issues to achieve better imple-
ment of real-time and intelligent applications [6].
There are two different communication scenarios, namely
Vehicle To Infrastructure (V2I) andVehicle ToVehicle (V2V)
in VANETs. As shown in Figure 1, there are three major
units in VANETs, which are the authentication server (AS),
wireless onboard unit (OBU) and roadside unit (RSU). Vehi-
cles in VANETs are deemed as mobile nodes equipped with
OBUs with an integration of the GPS receiver, ITS-G5/IEEE
802.11p protocols, and vehicular sensors [7]. The OBU is
in charge of recording information (e.g., velocity, location)
during driving and allows itself to correspond with RSU or
other vehicles. The RSU is fixed at the roadsides and plays
itself as public transport infrastructure to connect the vehi-
cle to the Internet through reliable communication channels.
Further, because of equipping with wireless devices, RSU
can exchange information with passing vehicles and gather
information to know about local situations [8]. Due to above
features and their inherent openness, VANETs are facing
a serious security challenge, like the issues of information
confidentiality, information integrity. Hence, it is becoming
increasingly important for protocols to have the ability to
provide drivers with secure and user friendly authentication
to achieve a secure communication [9].
FIGURE 1. Structure of the VANETS.
Owing to VANETs are vulnerable to malicious attacks
just as any other wireless network [7], [10]–[14], more and
more researchers are having eye on and taking part in pri-
vacy protection authentication. Authentication protocols for
VANETs have been designed by most researchers, including
those put forward for offering privacy protection during the
period of communication and those proposed for a reduc-
tion of the storage and computation/communication costs.
However, existing authentication protocols generally have
shortcomings against the external adversary. VANETs still
need a secure and effective authentication scheme. Our
research aims to construct an efficient and secure authentica-
tion scheme to eliminate these vulnerabilities of Zhou et al.’s
scheme under VANETs environment.
The major contributions of our improved scheme are listed
as following:
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
• First, in order to enhance the security, we bring up an
efficient privacy protection mutual authentication pro-
tocol for secure V2V communication in VANETs to
overcome the shortcomings of Zhou et al.’s scheme.
• Second, we reveal the weakness of Zhou et al.’s scheme
and give an in-depth description of the damaging threat
of the existing weakness.
• Third, we present an elaborate security analysis to for-
mally demonstrate that the proposed scheme is provable
security and meet the security goals in VANETs, espe-
cially in key protection.
• Finally, we display our performance analysis to demon-
strate that our scheme has a reasonable consumption
with a lower computation and communication cost than
the previous scheme in VANETs.
B. ROADMAP
To present our contributions and work, the rest of the frame-
work for this paper is structured as follows. The related work
in recent years is introduced in section II. We present the pre-
liminaries to the elliptical curve cryptosystem in Section III.
In Section IV, we have a review of Zhou et al.’s scheme.
In addition, section V points out its existing security vulner-
abilities. The main improvement of our proposal is described
in Section VI while Section VII describes the security anal-
ysis. We show the performance evaluation to demonstrate
our scheme’s reasonable overhead in Section VIII. At last,
we provide the conclusion of the paper in last section.
II. RELATED WORK
In order to address security and privacy issue in VANETs,
numerous research schemes [15]–[26], [30]–[32] have been
proposed. Raya and Hubaux [15] investigated an authenti-
cation scheme which pre-storaged many public and private
key pairs with a short lifecycle, as well as corresponding
certificates into each vehicle’s OBU to preserve drivers’
privacy. However, a vehicle’s OBU needs to store very
large number key pairs due to the changing key each time.
Raya and Hubaux’s scheme has a high computation cost,
since the key management is a complex problem.
To solve the shortcomings of Raya and Hubaux scheme,
a new privacy protection protocol, which adopted an alter-
native approach to avoidance of the preloading of a large
number of public or private key pairs of OBU and corre-
sponding certificates was designed by Lu et al. [17] in 2008.
In their scheme, when a vehicle passes through the RSU,
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each vehicle will receive an anonymous certificate for a
short period of time. In order to obtain anonymous cer-
tificates that change over time from RSU to avoid the
adversary’s traceability, the vehicle needs to execute this
procedure frequently. Hence, Lu et al.’s scheme with high
computation/communication and storage costs has a weak
efficiency. To address the weakness of Lu et al.’s scheme,
a novel authentication protocol combining mix-zones with
anonymous certificates was proposed by Freudiger et al. [18].
However, the scheme also must store massive anonymous
certificates. Additionally, in 2008, Zhang et al. [19] designed
a privacy-preserving authentication protocol with the Hash
message authentication code in VANETs. In their scheme, for
the sake of user’s privacy, the vehicle communicates with near
RSU using different public keys. Therefore, Zhang et al.’s
scheme also fails to meet the requirement of performance
in VANETs.
To address high computation and high storage costs
problems, these schemes [25], [26], [30]–[32] were pro-
posed. Zhang et al. [24], [25] designed an ID-based condi-
tional privacy protection authentication scheme in VANETs.
In their scheme, both the vehicle and RSU are not nec-
essary to store certificates. However, Lee and Lai found
that [24], [25] cannot resist replying attacks. [31] designed a
conditional privacy protection authentication and group-key
agreement scheme based on password for VANETs with
no use bilinear pairing. References [30], [32] proposed a
privacy-preserving authentication scheme to improve com-
putation efficiency. Chuang and Lee [26] proposed the
first authentication mechanism (TEAM) using a transitive
trust relationship for VANETs in 2014. TEAM is a quite
lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme, since
it only uses a hash function and an XOR operation to pro-
tect the drivers’ privacy and security from malicious adver-
sary. Vehicles are divided into three types in their scheme,
that is, mistrustful vehicles (MVs), trustful vehicles (TVs)
and law executors (LEs), as shown in Figure 1. However,
Kumari et al. [5] and Zhou et al. [23] revealed that Chuang
and Lee’s scheme suffers from privacy breach, insider
attack, impersonation attack and has some other weaknesses.
To address these vulnerabilities, on the basis of TEAM,
Zhou et al. applied Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) to
propose a new enhanced scheme which is based on mutual
authentication in VANETs. Nevertheless, according to our
research efforts, Zhou et al.’s scheme cannot withstand iden-
tity guessing attack and impersonation attack as well as has
weaker user anonymity.
To enhance security and privacy protection in VANETs,
we also use ECC technology to design a new privacy-
preserving authentication scheme. The formal and infor-
mal security analysis of our proposed scheme indicates its
provable security and could overcome the vulnerability in
Zhou et al.’s scheme. The performance analysis of our pro-
posed scheme demonstrates that it yields lower computa-
tional and communication overheads making it applicable to
dynamic topographic scenarios.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Mathematical problems in Elliptic Curve Cryptographic have
been widely used in the authentication scheme in VANETs.
In this paper, our proposed scheme uses the problem of
elliptic curve discrete logarithm to achieve its security. The
brief reviews on ECC are as follows:
Let G be an elliptic curve group, which is defined by a
prime number p and a generatorP. The following two difficult
problem assumptions are based on ECC and these problems
are difficult to solve.
Let E be an equation of the elliptic curve: y = x3+ ax + b
mod p, where a, b ∈RZ∗p .
Definition 1: Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given
two points P and Q on E randomly, the objective of the
DLP is to calculate an integer a ∈RZ∗p to meet the following
condition: Q is equal to aP.
Definition 2: Elliptic Curve Computational Diffe-Hellman
Problem (ECCDHP): Given two points R = aP and Q = bP
on E randomly, the objective of the ECCDHP is to calculate
the point abP, where a, b ∈RZ∗p are two unknown integers.
IV. REVIEW OF THE ZHOU ET AL.’s SCHEME
We review the Zhou et al.’s scheme based on TEAM
for VANETs in this section. TABLE 1 shows the sym-
bols and their corresponding meanings. We are only keen
on six phases of this scheme: initialization, registration,
login, general authentication, secure communication, key
update. In their scheme, as shown in Figure 1, vehicles have
three types: first is law executors (LEs), second is trust-
ful vehicles (TVs) and third is mistrustful vehicles (MVs).
LEs are always trustful and play a role of mobile authen-
tication server. In the beginning, the normal vehicle is
authenticated only via LE. Later, if this normal vehicle is
successfully authenticated, it will become a trustful vehicle.
TABLE 1. The notations and specific descriptions.
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Otherwise, it still a mistrustful vehicle. At this time, a normal
vehicle can be authenticated by LE or a trustful vehicle.When
the key’s lifecycle expires, the vehicle’s state changes from
trust to mistrust.
The whole process consists of 9 phases, which are ini-
tialization, registration, login, password change, general
authentication, trust-extended authentication, secure commu-
nication, key revocation, and key update. When AS starts
to set up the system parameters, the initiation phase will
be performed. Registration has two types, namely LE reg-
istration and normal vehicle registration. In LE registration
phase, a LE registers itself as a trustful vehicle with AS
using a secure transmit channel. In normal vehicle regis-
tration phase, which is performed only once by per vehi-
cle, all vehicles but LEs have to execute this phase before
they enter into VANETs. Useri has to execute the login
phase, when it hopes to VANETs supply the best service
for it. And if the Useri wants to try changing its pass-
word, the password change process is started. After Useri
has completed its login phase, the general authentication
procedure is performed between OBUi and LEj. At this
time, the state of OBUi changes from mistrust to trust
and gets the parameter psk (i.e., authentication key) after
achieving the general authentication procedure successfully.
Mistrustful OBUs can get authenticated by LEs at the gen-
eral authentication phase or trusted OBUi in trust-extended
authentication phase at present. Then, two trustful vehicles
can have a communication at secure communication phase.
When the key’s lifecycle expires, the vehicle’s state will
become mistrustful and the key revocation will be performed.
The state of the OBUi continues to be mistrustful again
when the lifecycle of key expires, and the key revocation
will be performed. When the key of a trustful vehicle is
nearing expiration, it can update the key during the key
update phase. This is the whole process of Zhou et al.’s
scheme.
Each vehicle is equipped with the OBU consisting of Event
Data Recorders (EDRs) and Tamper-Proof Devices (TPDs).
The former are in charge of recording event data (e.g., time,
location, login history of the vehicle, public parameters). The
latter prevent attackers from intercepting information from
OBU. Additionally, assuming that the GPS device synchro-
nizes the time of each vehicle. The vehicle broadcasts the
message with the authentication state (trusted or mistrusted)
periodically. The following displays Zhou et al.’s scheme in
detail.
A. INITIALIZATION
The following two steps are initialization procedures for AS
when setting up system parameters.
1) Let G be an elliptic curve group, which is defined by a
prime number p and a generator P.
2) The AS chooses x at random from RZ∗p as its secret
key and uses the one way hash chain method to cal-
culate secure key-sets { pski, i = 1, . . . , n }, such as,
h2(x) = h(h(x)), which is showed in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Generating key set by Hash Chain method.
B. REGISTRATION
1) LE REGISTRATION
LE is registered with AS through a secure channel in this
process. AS uses the hash-chain to calculate secure key-sets
{ pski, i = 1, . . . , n }, and sends both key-sets and public
parameters { G,P, p } to LE. LE stores these parameters in
its reliable security hardware OBU. To ensure the robust
security, the lifecycle of every pski needs to be set shorter.
2) NORMAL VEHICLE REGISTRATION
When all vehicles enter the market, they are required to per-
form the procedure by means of the manufacturer or a secure
channel, but LE is an exception. Each vehicle is registered
only once in this process. Here are several steps of this stage:
1) Useri→AS:Useri selects its password pwi, then trans-
mits its identity idi and pwi to the AS using a secure
channel.
2) After receiving the identity idi and secret password pwi
from Useri, the AS selects yi as a random number,
and then calculates ai = h(x||idi), bi = ai ⊕ h(pwi),
ci = ai ⊕ h(psk||yi), di = h(idi||pwi||ai).
3) AS→Useri: The AS stores the parameters (i.e., h(),G,
P, p, bi, ci, di, yi) in its OBU reliable security hardware
using a secure channel.
4) Useri selects a number xi as its private key, and then
calculates Ppubi = xiP which is deemed to its public
key, and then calculates zi = h(pwi) ⊕ xi and stores
both Ppubi and zi in its reliable security hardware.
C. LOGIN
When a Useri intends to access service from VANETs, this
procedure is performed.
1) Useri → OBUi: Useri submits its real identity idi and
password pwi to OBUi.
2) Verify: OBUi recalculates ai = h(pwi) ⊕ bi. Then
it verifies di = h(idi||pwi||ai) holds or not. If so,
it indicates that these parameters (idi, pwi) inputted by
the Useri are correct. Otherwise, OBUi denies the user
login request.
D. GENERAL AUTHENTICATION
On completing the login process, OBUi implements this pro-
cedure with the help of the LE. Here are seven steps of this
stage.
1) The OBUi calculates aidi = h(ri)⊕ idi, where ri ∈RZ∗p
is generated randomly, m1 = h(ai) ⊕ ri and m2 =
h(ri||aidi||ci||yi), where ai is obtained from login phase.
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2) OBUi → LEj: OBUi obtains these parameters
(i.e., aidi, ci, yi, m1, m2) after step 1), and then it sends
these authentication parameters to LEj.
3) LEj receives these authentication parameters (i.e., aidi,
ci, yi, m1, m2) after step 2) from OBUi, and then it uses
psk to recalculate ai and ri = m1 ⊕ h(ai) and then
verifies whether m2 = h(ri||aidi||ci||yi) holds or not.
If so, LEj calculates aidj = idj ⊕ h(rj), where rj ∈RZ∗p ,
skij = h(ri||rj). Then LEj computers the reply message
m3 = rj ⊕ h2(ri), m4 = psk ⊕ rj, and the verification
message m5 = h(aidj||skij||rj||psk).
4) LEj→ OBUi: On calculating these response messages,
LEj returns response messages (i.e., m3, m4, m5, aidj)
to OBUi.
5) receiving the response message after step 4) from
LEj, OBUi calculates h2(ri) and then retrieves
rj = m3 ⊕ h2(ri), and then uses rj to retrieve psk =
rj ⊕ m4, and skij = h(ri||rj). Next, OBUi computers
h(aidi||skij||rj||psk) and checks if it and m5 are equal.
If not so, the OBUi terminates the process. Otherwise,
OBUi computers the m6 = skij ⊕ h(rj) and then calcu-
lates: c∗i = h(psk||ri) ⊕ ai, ei = psk ⊕ h(pwi). At this
time, c∗i and ri take place of ci and yi. Finally, OBUi
stores them in its reliable security hardware.
6) OBUi→ LEj: OBUi sends m6 to LEj.
7) LEj calculates h(rj), where rj is generated at step 3) and
uses skij to retrieve h(rj) and checks whether the two
have value are equal.
At this time, OBUi is trustful since it has obtained the
authentication parameter psk . From now to start, OBUi can
authenticate other normal vehicles like LE.
E. SECURE COMMUNICATION
When two trusted OBUi and OBUj intend to have an interac-
tion with each other, they will perform the secure communi-
cation procedure, the followings are the steps.
1) OBUi uses ei to retrieve psk = ei ⊕ h(pwi) and uses zi
to retrieve xi = zi ⊕ h(pwi) and calculates the message
aidi = idi⊕h(riPpubj ), where ri is generated randomly,
T = riP, ui = T + psk · P, and m1 = h(T ||idi||aidi).
2) OBUi→ OBUj: The request information (i.e.,m1, aidi,
ui) is transmitted to OBUj by OBUi.
3) As soon as OBUj receives these secure communication
messages (i.e., m1, aidi, ui) from OBUi, it uses psk to
retrieve T = ui - psk , and then calculates idi = aidi ⊕
h(xjT ), and checks if m1 and h(T ||idi||aidi) are equal.
If not, the request will be rejected. Otherwise, OBUj
generates a random number rj and calculates: aidj =
idj⊕h(rjPpubi ), R = rjP, uj = R+psk · P, s = rjPpubi+
xjT , k = h(T ||R||Ppubi ||Ppubj ||s), m2 = h(idj||k).
4) OBUj → OBUi: OBUj sends the response information
(i.e., aidj, m2, uj) to OBUi.
5) Upon receiving (i.e., aidj, uj) from OBUj, OBUi calcu-
lates R = uj - psk · P, idj = aidj⊕h(xiR), s = riPpubj+
xiR, k = h(T ||R||Ppubi ||Ppubj ||s), then checks whether
m2 and h(idj||k) are equal. If yes, OBUi believes OBUj
is trustful and calculates the reply information m3 =
h(uj||k). If not, the process will be terminated.
6) OBUi→ OBUj: OBUi sends m3 to OBUj.
7) Upon receiving m3 from OBUi, OBUj checks whether
m3 and h(uj||k) are equal. If yes, the session key k can
be used for secure communication. If not, the process
will be terminated.
F. KEY UPDATE
In Zhou et al.’s scheme, the procedure is as same as in the
Chuang-Lee scheme.
V. WEAKNESS OF ZHOU ET AL.’s SCHEME
In this section, we show that Zhou et al.’s scheme fails to
withstand the identity guessing and the impersonation attack
even the session key leaking. In particular, it cannot achieve
the security requirement of resisting the identity guessing
in Zhou et al.’s scheme.
A. IDENTITY GUESSING ATTACK
Here, we list the steps that the adversary guesses the user’s
identity.
1) Guess the value of idi to be id∗i from a uniformly
distributed identity dictionary Did .
2) Precisely because the open channel is exposed and
unprotected on VANETs, the adversary can intercept
some messages as follows: {aidi,m1,m3,m4, ci, yi}.
3) Calculate h∗(ri) = aidi ⊕ id∗i , r
∗
j = m3 ⊕ [h
∗(ri)]2,




||yi) ⊕ ci, r∗i = m1 ⊕




j ), where {aidi,m1,m3,m4, ci, yi}
is intercepted from the public channel.
4) Verify the correctness of id∗i by comparing h(r
∗
i )
and h∗(ri) holds or not.
5) Repeat 1), 3), 4) until the correct value of idi is found.
Let |Did | be the size of the identity dictionary Did . As a
matter of fact, |Did | is limited for users’ own reasons. It is
well known that users are prone to choose identities that are
easier to remember for convenience, or a meaningful phrase
as his/her identity in normal circumstances. Bonneau and
Joseph [27] pointed out that the space of Did has a range,
e.g., |Did | ≤ |Dpw| ≤ 106 . Moreover, the procedure of
the identity guessing for the adversary only requires passive
guessing attack and does not involve special encryption oper-
ations. And the time complexity of the above attack procedure
is O(|Did | ∗ TH ), where TH is the execution time of the Hash
function. That’s to say, the time for the adversary to obtain the
OBUi’s identity is a linear function of the |Did |. According
to the above description, identity guessing attack is very
effective for the adversary.
Assuming the correct value of idi is obtained by the adver-
sary, user’s real identity will be found. Therefore, identity
guessing attack helps the adversary reveal the user’s real
identity idi. Hence, Zhou et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to
identity guessing attack and provides weaker user anonymity.
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B. SECURE SESSION KEY DISCLOSURE
As we all know, it is important that principals can prove each
other’s identities to realize identity authentication and then
build a session key for a secure networked authentication
system. The session key skij created betweenOBUi and LEj in
the process of general mutual authentication can be extracted
by the adversary through skij = h(r∗i ||r
∗





obtained from identity guessing attack phase. If the adversary
finds the correct value of idi, the session keywill be disclosed.
C. IMPERSONATION ATTACK
To impersonate as OBUi, the adversary should be able to
access the user’s associated value ri, otherwise he/she can-
not obtain the valid authentication request message. For the
adversary can select the random number r∗i , which can also
be recovered from the procedure of identity guessing attack,
and obtain aidi, ci, yi from the open channel on the Inter-
net, and he/she can compute the correct request message
m2 = h(r∗i ||aidi||ci||yi). Hence, [23] cannot resist an imper-
sonation attack.
In above analysis, we have revealed that the scheme pro-
posed by Zhou et al could not achieve certain important secu-
rity requirements in our new but realistic attacking scenario.
VI. THE PROPOSED IMPROVED SCHEME
This section proposes an improved privacy protection authen-
tication scheme to address these shortcomings of Zhou et al.’s
scheme [23] in VANETs. There are also three types of vehi-
cles in our proposed scheme, which are law executors (LEs),
trusted vehicles (TVs) and mistrusted vehicles (MVs) respec-
tively, as shown in Figure 1. There are also nine phases
in our proposed scheme: Initialization, Registration, Login,
Password Change, General Authentication, Trust-Extended
Authentication, Secure Communication, Key Revocation,
Key Update. Table 1 shows all notations used in our scheme.
In the following, we describe our proposed improved scheme
in depth.
A. INITIALIZATION
This procedure mainly is used by the AS to set up the system
parameters and it is as same as in Zhou et al.’s scheme.
B. REGISTRATION
1) LE REGISTRATION
This procedure is as same as in Zhou et al.’s scheme.
2) NORMAL VEHICLE REGISTRATION
Except for LE does not require this registration, all other
vehicles have to be registered in this phase when they left
the car factory. Each vehicle is registered only once in this
process. Below we describe the normal vehicle registration
while Figure 3 shows the steps.
1) A user selects its identity idi and password pwi and
calculates h(pwi). (idi, h(pwi)) are sent to the AS using
a secure channel.
FIGURE 3. Normal vehicle registration phase.
2) Upon receiving parameters (idi, h(pwi)) from OBUi,
the AS chooses a random number yi and performs
following operations: ai = h(idi||x), bi = ai ⊕ h(pwi),
ci = h(psk||yi) ⊕ si, si = h(ai) ⊕ psk , where si is
only known by the AS at present and x is the secret
key to AS.
3) The AS stores a set of parameters (i.e., bi, ci, yi, h(),
G, P, P) in the reliable security hardware OBU using a
secure channel, where G, P, p are defined in initializa-
tion phase.
4) Useri inputs its real identity idi and password pwi to
OBUi and selects a number xi at random as its private
key and calculates Ppubi = xiP as its public key and
zi = xi ⊕ h(pwi). OBUi extracts ai = bi⊕h(pwi) using
bi and pwi, and then calculates the validate parameter
di = h(idi||pwi||ai) and stores (Ppubi , zi, di) in its OBU.
The parameter zi protects the security of the private key
xi and can prevent the side channel attack.
C. LOGIN
Vehicle users need to be verified first when they intend to get
to access to service from VANETs. The details of the login
phase are as followed.
1) Useri → OBUi: Useri inputs its real identity idi and
password pwi to OBUi.
2) Upon receiving idi and pwi, OBUi recalculates ai using
bi, then checks whether h(idi||pwi||ai) is equals to di or
not. If its correct,OBUi believes the user is legal. If not,
the login request will be rejected.
D. PASSWORD CHANGE
This procedure in our scheme is as same as in Zhou et al.’s
scheme.
E. GENERAL AUTHENTICATION
When the vehicle intends to establish authentication session,
the general authentication will be performed between OBUi
and LEj. The steps are discussed in this part and showed
in Figure 4.
1) OBUi generates a random number ri ∈ Z∗p and calcu-
lates: aidi = h(ri||to) ⊕ idi, m1 = h(ai) ⊕ ri, m2 =
h(ri||aidi||ci||yi||to), where to is the current time stamp
of OBUi and ai has acquired in the login phase.
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FIGURE 4. Normal vehicle authentication phase.
2) OBUi → LEj: The authentication message (i.e., aidi,
ci, yi, m1, m2, to) is transmitted to LEj by OBUi.
3) Upon receiving (i.e., aidi, ci, yi, m1, m2, to) from
OBUi, LEj checks to is fresh or not firstly. If not, LEj
thinks that there may be a reply attack from an invalid
OBUi. If yes, LEj calculates si using ci ⊕ h(psk||yi),
h(ai) = si ⊕ psk and then retrieves ri = m1 ⊕ h(ai),
and next checks whether m2 = h(ri||ci ||aidi||yi||to)
holds or not. If it does, LEj calculates aidj = h(rj||tl)⊕
idj, where rj ∈ Z∗p is generated randomly by LEj,
the session key skij = h(ri||rj||tl), where tl denotes
the current time of LEj. And then calculates: m3 =
rj ⊕ h2(ri||tl), m4 = si ⊕ h(rj), the verification mes-
sage m5 = h(ri||rj||aidi|| aidj||skij||si). If it does not,
the authentication request will be rejected.
4) LEj → OBUi: LEj transmits the authentication
response message (i.e., aidj, m3, m4, m5, tl) to OBUi.
5) On receiving the response message from LEj, OBUi
firstly checks tl is fresh or not. If not, OBUi thinks
there may be a reply attack. If yes, OBUi calculates:
rj = m3 ⊕ h2(ri||tl), si = m4 ⊕ h(rj), skij =
h(ri||rj||tl). Then, OBUi checks whether the equation
m5 = h(ri||rj||aidi||aidj||skij||si) holds or not. If it does,
OBUi affirms that the LEj is trustful. Next, OBUi
calculatesm6 = skij ⊕ h(rj||aidj), c∗i = h(psk||ri)⊕ ai;
and replaces the ci and yi with c∗i and ri. Actually,OBUi
is trustful now, since it can extract psk using si ⊕ h(ai);
calculates ei = h(pwi)⊕ psk and stores it in its reliable
security hardware. In this way, an adversary cannot
obtain information to initiate a side channel attack.
Otherwise, authentication process will be terminated
by OBUi.
6) OBUi submits m6 to LEj.
7) Upon receiving the message m6 , LEj calculates:
h∗(rj||aidj) = skij ⊕ m6,
then checks h∗(rj||aidj) is equal to h(rj||aidj) or not.
This also can avoid a reply attack from an invalidOBUi.
F. TRUSTED-EXTENDED AUTHENTICATION
This procedure in our scheme is as same as in Zhou et al.’s
scheme.
G. SECURE COMMUNICATION
Two trusted Vehicles can complete this process in the secure
communication phase, the following steps are described in
this part, as shown in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5. Secure communication phase.
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1) OBUi selects a randomnumber ri and calculates: aidi =
idi ⊕ h(ri||toi), T = xiPpubj , m1 = h(psk||toi) ⊕ ri,
and the verification messagem2 = h(aidi|| T || idi|| toi),
where psk = ei ⊕ h(pwi) is obtained from the login
phase and toi denotes the current time stamp of OBUi.
2) OBUi → OBUj: The request message (i.e., m1, m2,
aidi, toi) is transmitted to OBUj by OBUi.
3) On receiving the request message (i.e., m1, m2, aidi,
toi) from OBUi, OBUj firstly checks whether toi is
fresh or not. If not, OBUj thinks there may be a replay
attack. If yes, OBUj calculates T using its own private
key and public key of OBUi, T = xjPpubi , ri =
m1 ⊕ psk||toi), idi = aidi ⊕ h(ri||toi), then checks
whether m2 = h(aidi||T ||idi||toi) is equal to m2 or not.
If it’s,OBUj selects a random number rj and calculates:
aidj = idj ⊕ h(rj||toj), m3 = h(psk||toj) ⊕ rj, skij =
h(idi||idj||T ||toi||toj||psk), m4 = h(idj||skij).
4) OBUj → OBUi: OBUj submits its response message
(i.e., m3, m4, aidj, toj) to OBUi.
5) Upon receiving the response message (i.e., m3, m4,
aidj, toj) from OBUj, where toj denotes the current
time stamp of OBUj, OBUi firstly checks whether toj
is fresh or not. If not, OBUi thinks there may be a reply
attack. If yes, OBUi calculates: rj = m3 ⊕ h(psk||toj),
idj = aidj ⊕ h(rj||toj), skij = h(idi||idj||T ||toi||toj||psk)
and then checks whether h(idj||skij) is equal to m4 or
not. If its, OBUi calculates the reply message m5 =
h(rj||skij). If not, the process will fail.
6) OBUi submits its reply message m5 to OBUj.
7) Upon receiving the message m5, OBUj recalculates
h(rj||skij) and checks whether m5 = h(rj||skij) holds
or not. If yes, the OBUi and OBUj both reach the
trust threshold of each other. So, they can communicate
securely using the skij session key to ensure communi-
cation security. If not, the process will be terminated.
H. KEY REVOCATION
This procedure in our scheme is the same as the Zhou et al.’s
scheme which is same as the TEAM.
I. KEY UPDATE
The key update procedure will be triggered when the TV’s
key lifecycle is coming to an end. The process is displayed as
follows.
1) OBUi selects a number ri randomly to calculate
m1 = ri ⊕ pskold , m2 = msgkup ⊕ pskold , m3 =
h(ri||toi||msgkup), where toi is the current time stamp of
OBUi.
2) OBUi submits the key update request (i.e., m1, m2, m3,
toi) to LEj.
3) Upon receiving (i.e., m1, m2, m3, toi) from OBUi, LEj
firstly checks toi is fresh or not. If not, LEj considers
there may be a reply attack. If yes, then LEj recalculates
ri = m1 ⊕ pskold , msgkup = m2 ⊕ pskold ; checks
whether h(ri||toi||msgkup) is equal to m3. If it’s, LEj
believes OBUi is trustful. Then, LEj chooses a random
number rj to calculate m4 = rj ⊕ h(ri||tlj), m5 =
psknew ⊕ h(rj||tlj), m6 = h(ri||rj||psknew||tlj), where tlj
is the current time stamp of LEj. Next, LEj calculates
skij = h(ri||rj||psknew||toi||toj).
4) The reply message (m4, m5, m6 , tlj) is sent by LEj
to OBUi.
5) Upon receiving (m4, m5, m6 , tlj), OBUi firstly checks
tlj is fresh or not. If not, OBUi considers there may
be a reply attack. If yes, OBUi retrieves rj = m4 ⊕
h(ri||tlj), psknew = m5 ⊕ h(rj||tlj); checks whether
h(ri||rj||psknew||tlj) is equal tom6 . If it’s,OBUi believes
LEj is trustful.
6) OBUi updates the authentication parameter psk using
psknew, and recalculates the session key skij =
h(ri||rj||psknew||toi||toj) to be used for the secure com-
munication between two trusted vehicles.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To illustrate security, the security analysis of our proposed
scheme in this section will be analyzed. First, the formal
security analysis is given to prove our proposed scheme is
secure. Second, we apply the informal security analysis to
show the feasibility of coming up with security requirements
in VANETs.
A. SECURITY MODEL
The capabilities of the adversary and security requirements
of the mutual authentication protocol are presented in this
subsection. The security model of our proposed improved
scheme is realized by the game between an adversary A and a
challenger. Our security proofs adopt a random oracle model
from Bellare et al. [28]. Concrete security requirements can
be referred to [26]. An adversary A can be a probabilistic
polynomial time machine [28]. When A gets access to all
the possible oracles, which are described as below, we allow
it to potentially control both the general authentication pro-
cess and the secure communication process in our improved
scheme. Both OBU Vi and LE Li are a participant. Let U ii
denote the ith instance Ui, where U denotes all participants,
and they all could be considered to be an oracle.
Definition 1 (Adversary Abilities):
• Execute(V ii ,U
i
i ): This query tests the adversary’s passive
attack ability. The adversary A is allowed to get access
to the honest general authentication procedure and the
communication procedure. This query is answered with
the honest execution transcripts of the proposed proto-
col.
• Send(U ii , m0): This query tests the adversary’s active
attack ability. A could transmit a message m0 to the ora-
cle U ii . On receiving this request message m0, the result
and answer are returned to A by the oracle according to
the proposed protocol.
• Reveal(U ii ): In this query, the oracle simulates a known
key attack. The adversary A could get a session key from
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the oracleU ii , if the oracle has obtained a session key.
Otherwise, it returns ⊥ to the adversary.
• Corrupt(V ii ): In this query, the oracle simulates a violent
attack. It allows the adversary A to get access to U ii ’s
secret information stored in the vehicle’s OBU.
• Test(U ii ): This query tests the AKE security of the U
i
i ’s
session key. The adversary A could ask the oracle for
the real session key at most once. On receiving this test
query, the oracle outputs an unbiased bit value b. If b is
equal to 1, the oracle will return the session key to A.
Otherwise, it returns ⊥ to A.
Definition 2 (Freshness): An instance U ii is fresh unless
one of following situations occurs:
1) The Reveal-query has been sent by U ii or its partner.
2) The adversary A queries the Corrupt(V ii ) at the
meantime.
3) Before U ii or its partner sent the Test-query, they had
already been sent the Corrupt-query.
Definition 3 (Semantic Security): Let the adversary As
ability to beat our protocol be the probability of guessing the
bit b got involved in the Test session. To be specific, let’s
define the advantage of A to be: our scheme is AKE-secure
if AdvakeO2L/O2O(A) is negligibly greater than max{(qs/|D|, ε)}
with qs Send-queries at the most, where |D| is the space of
the password dictionary.
B. THE FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
The formal security analysis under the random oracle model
is given from aspects of its theorems as well as its correspond-
ing proofs in detail. The details are displayed as follows.
Theorem 1:We define Gp be the elliptic curve group, O2L
be an event that the adversary A could control the general
authentication procedure between OBU and LE. Let D be a
password dictionary following a uniformly distributed and its
size is |D|. Let 2l be the space of the Hash Function, where l
denotes the bit length of Hash values. And let A denote
an adversary against the general authentication procedure of
our scheme by executing at the most qe Execute-queries,











Proof of Theorem 1: We demonstrate that the proposed
protocol is provably secure with Exp0, Exp1, Exp2, Exp3,
Exp4. Let Sun (1 ≤ n ≤ 4) denote the event that A success-
fully guesses b from the Test-query.
Experiment Exp0: This experiment models a real attack.
According to our definition AdvakeO2L(A), we have:
F0 = AdvakeO2L(A) = 2Pr[Su0]− 1.
Experiment Exp1: All oracles Execute, Send, Reveal, Cor-
rupt, Test in this experiment are modeled. The adversary A
cannot distinguish Exp0 and Exp1. Hence,
F1 = |Pr[Su0]− Pr[Su1]| = 0.
Experiment Exp2: In this experiment, all oracles are also
simulated. There is a collision in Exp2. If the collision occurs,
the adversary A will initiate a reply attack to win the game.
We can have the probability of collisions according to the
birthday paradox. Hence,
• If there’s a hash collision occurs, the probability of the
collision at most is
q2h
2l+1 .
So, only in above case can Exp1 and Exp2 be distinguished,
and:




Experiment Exp3: Now, all oracles have been modeled
in Exp3. Once the adversary A obtains the correct session
key: sk = h(ri||rj||tl), the invalid OBUi could extract the
pre-shared key between LE and AS. However, A could do
nothing with only bi, ci, di, yi, zi and Ppubi , because ri, rj
is required for A to break a session key. Hence, we have a
hypothesis that A has queried Corrupt(V ii ). If A intends to
break the session key sk = h(ri||rj||tl), it must compute
ri, rj with the value ai, where ai = bi ⊕ h(pwi). However,
it is hard to recover ai without the correct password pwi. A
asks Corrupt(V ii ) and guesses pwi from the dictionary D with
maximum qs Send-queries. Therefore, the probability at most
is qs
|D| . Then we have:







Experiment Exp4:Besides, we say that A succeeds theO2L
of the scheme ifA uses the Test(U ii ) oracle and returns the real
bit guess. Thus,


































Theorem 2: Let O2O be an event that A could violate the
secure communication procedure betweenOBUi andOBUj of
two trusted vehicles. Did and D are identity dictionary with
the size of |Did | and identity dictionary with the size of |D|
respectively and both of them follow a uniformly distributed.
Let AdvECDHPA be the advantage for A in solving the ECCDHP
in a polynomial time. Let A denote an adversary against the
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secure communication procedure. Let |Hash| denote the Hash
function space. And within the time complexity limit t, A can

















+ 2qh((qs + qe)2 + 1)
∗AdvakeO2O(A)(t + (qe + qs)tm).
Proof of Theorem 2:
Experiment Exp0: This experiment models a real attack.
According to our definition AdvakeO2O(A), we have
AdvakeO2O(A) = 2Pr[Su0]− 1.
Experiment Exp1: All oracles Execute, Send, Reveal, Cor-
rupt, Test in this experiment are modeled. The adversary A
cannot distinguish Exp0 and Exp1. Hence,
F1 = |Pr[Su1]− Pr[Su0]| = 0.
Experiment Exp2: Here, all the oracles Send, Execute,
Reveal, Corrupt, and Test are alsomodeled in this experiment.
Once A gets the real identity idi of trusted OBUi, idj of
trusted OBUj from the identity space, we stop simulating this
guessing identity attacks.
So, Exp2 and Exp1 cannot be distinguished unless the case
appears, and:




Experiment Exp3: In this experiment, all oracles are also
simulated. There exist two styles of collisions in Exp3. If both
collisions occur, the adversary A will initiate a reply attack
to win the game. We can have the probability of collisions
according to the birthday paradox. Hence,
• If there’s a hash collision occurs, the probability of the
collision at most is
q2h
2l+1 .
• If there’s a collision between the random number
ri and rj, the probability of the collision at most
(qs+qe)2
2p .
So, only in following cases can Exp1 and Exp2 be distin-
guished, and:







Experiment Exp4: Here, all the oracles that have been
modeled in Exp3 are also modeled in this experiment. When
Corrupt(V ii ) is queried, the adversary A can extract the infor-
mation bi, ci, di, yi, zi, Ppubi and ei stored in the vehicle’s
OBU, To break the session key, A needs to know the secret
key xi, psk , idi, idj and the random number ri as well as rj.
It is difficult to recover psk and xi from the information bi,
ci, di, yi, zi, Ppubi and ei without getting the correct password.
The adversary cannot get the user password, since there is
no user password in the whole communication message. So,
we have:







Experiment Exp5: Here and now, all oracles in Exp4 have
beenmodeled. In this experiment, we consider the probability
that A forges the authentication value m2, m4, m5 without
using random oracles for corresponding queries. Unless the
oracle can stop the game with right values, Exp5 becomes
indistinguishable from Exp4 to A. Hence, we will have:




Experiment Exp6 : Here and now, Exp6 will simu-
late the hash oracle h to break the session key sk =
h(idi||idj||xiPpubj ||psk||toi||toj). Computing xiPpubj belongs
to ECCDHP. The case when the adversary A queries
the oracle h on idi||idj||xiPpubj ||psk||toi||toj, and the oracle
responds the value as follows: idi||idj||xiPpubj ||psk||toi||toj||
ECCDH (xjPpubi ,Ppubi )+ ECCDH (xiPpubj ,Ppubj ). So, Exp5
and Exp4 cannot be distinguished unless the above case
occurs. We define the advantage of A as AdvakeO2O(A)
(t + (qe + qs)tm), while t is the maximum time and tm is the
point multiplication time based on ECC. A can win the game
at the fewest qh hash-queries. Then, we have:
F6 = |Pr[Su6 ]− Pr[Su5]|
≤ qhAdvakeO2O(A)(t + (qe + qs)tm).
Experiment Exp7 : In this experiment, we suppose that A
has issued Corrupt(V ii ) after the previous Test query. Similar
to the Exp6 , if the session key sk can be obtained in the hash
oracle h, the probability that xi and xj are in the same session
is 1
(qs+qe)2
. So we will have:
F7 = |Pr[Su6 ]− Pr[Su5]|
≤ qh(qs + qe)2AdvakeO2O(A)(t + (qe + qs)tm).
Besides, A will succeed against an oracle, if the Test query
return it the real bit Guess randomly. So, we have:














+ |Pr[Su5]− Pr[Su6 ]|
+ |Pr[Su6 ]− Pr[Su7 ]|
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+ qh((qs + qe)2 + 1)
∗AdvakeO2O(A)(t + (qe + qs)tm).
















+ 2qh((qs + qe)2 + 1)
∗AdvakeO2O(A)(t + (qe + qs)tm).
C. OTHER DISCUSSIONS
1) Resistance to insider attack enhancement: If the real
password is stored in plaintext form in AS, the AS may
careless use of it. So in our scheme Useri sends its
(idi, h(pwi)) to AS. AS cannot recalculate the password
because of the one-way feature of the hash function.
So AS cannot misuse the password.
2) Anonymity, Identity Privacy-Preserving and the loca-
tion privacy of user Enhancement: If the anonymity
has not changed for a long time, the adversary can still
steal the trajectory privacy. If the real user’s identity
is transmitted in plaintext form on VANETs, it can
be analyzed the message easily by the attack. In our
scheme, we also use XOR operation with a hash to
increase the security of anonymous identity. However,
the hash takes a timestamp to connect to a random as
an input. We use double security parameters (random
number, timestamp) to change anonymity dynamically.
Above all, the adversary cannot get the user privacy by
intercepting information.
3) Secure session key enhancement: Although in Zhou
et al.’s scheme, the session key is diverse in different
authentication or communication phase, the session key
can be leaked by guessing the identity from the identity
space, the explanation is described in the following 5)
in detail. In our scheme, the session key is secure and
also change dynamically because of the hash of the cur-
rent time. The reasons of security are also demonstrated
in the following 5).
4) Resistance to password guessing attack: Since there is
no user password in the whole communication mes-
sage, the adversary cannot obtain the user password.
5) Resistance to identity guessing and impersonation
attack: Assuming Did denotes the size of the identity
space, a adversary guesses a id∗i from a uniformly dis-
tributed identity dictionary Did of OBUi and computes
the following parameters in Zhou et al.’s scheme:
h∗(ri) = aidi ⊕ id∗i ,
r∗j = m3 ⊕ [h
∗(ri)]2,




r∗i = m1 ⊕ h(a
∗
i ),
skij = h(r∗i ||r
∗
j ).
And then compares the h(r∗i )? = h
∗(ri), if yes,
the adversary guess the idi of OBUi successfully. Next,
the skij = h(r∗i ||r
∗
j ) also be guesses successfully by the
adversary. Therefore, Zhou et al.’s scheme still has
security threats. In our scheme, assuming that the
adversary also guesses a id∗i from the L of OBUi and
computers skij that is generated by the hash that takes
random number ri, rj as the input. ri, rj are encrypted
by key ai, and ai is known by AS and trustful OBU.
Therefore, our scheme can resist to identity guessing
attack, but Zhou et al.’s cannot.
6) Resistance to reply attack: In our proposal, all the trans-
mitted messages contain current time stamps, so these
messages must pass the check of the time stamp fresh-




To demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed scheme,
we analyze computation cost of the authentication and secure
communication phase respectively. The following display is
the performance analysis of [23] and our scheme.We analyze
the computation and communication cost by contrast between
our proposed scheme and [23]. These symbols Th, Tm, Ta
respectively illustrate the execution time of shs-hash-256,
scalar point multiplication and scalar addition multiplication
based on ECC. These related operations are based upon the
miracl c++ library [29]. In our scheme, the machine parame-
ters are Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3337UCPU, 1.8GHz andRAM
is 4GB on a Windows 10 PC.
As shown in TABLE 2, 3, 4, the authentication time of [23]
is about 17 Th ≈ 0.170 ms, the authentication time of our
scheme is about 18Th ≈ 0.180 ms, the communication time
of [23] is about 12Th + 10Tm+ 6Ta ≈ 12Th + 10Tm ≈
29.900 ms, and Ta  Tm, Th. Then the communication
time of our scheme is about 16Th + 2Tm ≈ 6.116 ms.
As shown in Figure 6, TABLE 5, [23] is slightly lighter
TABLE 2. The execution time of basic operation.
TABLE 3. The Authentication cost and total execution time of each
scheme.
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TABLE 4. The communication cost and total execution time of each
scheme.
FIGURE 6. Comparison of authentication cost.
TABLE 5. Comparison of security features
than our scheme in authentication cost, however, it cannot
meet security requirements that we know about. As shown
in Figure 7, it is noteworthy that the communication cost of
our scheme is far more lightweight than [23], so our scheme
yields better efficiency than previously proposed scheme in
VANETs. At the same time, our scheme can resist malicious
attacks which have been analyzed in section VII and shown
in TABLE 5. Therefore, our scheme is a robust improvement
of the privacy-preserving authentication scheme.
B. RSU SERVING CAPABILITY
When getting into the DSRC communication coverage of a
LE/trusted vehicle in the area of RSU, the mistrusted vehicle
will firstly build a mutual authentication with the LE/trusted
vehicle. After the authentication process is finished, trusted
vehicles can communicate with each other. RSU can broad-
cast some safety information SI , such as school zone, traf-
fic signal, or accident zone periodically to trusted vehicles.
FIGURE 7. Consumption time of each scheme.
We calculate RSU serving capability on the basis of the
formula defined in [30] RSUser =
p·Tcom·r
s·d , where p, r , Tcom,
s, and d respectively denote the probability for RSU to send
SI messages to the trusted vehicles within its communica-
tion range r (200m), the communication time between RSU
and trusted vehicles, the average speed of a trusted vehicle,
the number of trusted vehicles. In our scheme, we assume
that the Tcom is as same as between two trusted vehicles’,
16Th + 2Tm ≈ 6.116 ms.
As shown in Figure 8, we can see that 8 ≤ s ≤ 10, 200 ≤
d ≤ 400. It can be observed that the performance of the
RSU in our scheme is effective. RSU can generate 33 session
keys and communicate with corresponding trusted vehicles
for each 200 ms. We also have an observation that RSUser
is directly proportional to r and inversely proportional to the
FIGURE 8. RSU serving capacity under different speed and the number of
vehicles.
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number d and the speed s of trusted vehicles.We can calculate
that a LE can authenticate about 200 mistrusted vehicles for
each 200ms due to the limit of the vehicle density, but 1111 in
theory. Hence, we come to the conclusion that our scheme has
lowermessage loss than Zhou et al.’s when the vehicle density
inside the communication area enlarges.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We find that Zhou et al.’s scheme cannot achieve some of
vital security requirements due to its vulnerability to iden-
tity guessing attack and impersonation attack in this paper.
In addition, to overcome the weakness of Zhou et al.’s
scheme, by using elliptic curves encryption technology, a new
efficient privacy-preserving mutual authentication scheme
for secure V2V communication has been proposed by us. The
security analysis suggests that this scheme can eliminate the
security vulnerability of the previously proposed authentica-
tion scheme. The performance evaluation and analysis of the
calculating result indicate that our proposed authentication
scheme yields reasonable cost since it has lower computation
and communication overhead than the previous one. Hence,
our improvement is more effective and securer in the VANET
environment.
REFERENCES
[1] F.-Y. Wang, D. Zeng, and L. Yang, ‘‘Smart cars on smart roads:
An ieee intelligent transportation systems society update,’’ IEEE Pervasive
Comput., vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 68–69, Oct./Dec. 2006.
[2] R. G. Engoulou, M. Bellaïche, S. Pierre, and A. Quintero, ‘‘VANET
security surveys,’’ Comput. Commun., vol. 44, pp. 1–13, May 2014.
[3] K. Hwang and M. Chen, Big-Data Analytics for Cloud, IoT and Cognitive
Computing. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2017.
[4] Y. Liu, Y. Wang, and G. Chang, ‘‘Efficient privacy-preserving dual authen-
tication and key agreement scheme for secure V2V communications in
an IoV paradigm,’’ IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst., vol. 18, no. 10,
pp. 2740–2749, Oct. 2017.
[5] S. Kumari, M. Karuppiah, X. Li, F. Wu, A. K. Das, and V. Odelu,
‘‘An enhanced and secure trust-extended authentication mechanism for
vehicular ad-hoc networks,’’ Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 9, no. 17,
pp. 4255–4271, 2016.
[6] M. Chen, Y. Hao, K. Lin, L. Hu, and Z. Yuan, ‘‘Label-less learning for
traffic control in an edge network,’’ IEEE Netw., vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 8–14,
Nov. 2018.
[7] B. Liu, D. Jia, J. Wang, K. Lu, and L. Wu, ‘‘Cloud-assisted safety message
dissemination in VANET–cellular heterogeneous wireless network,’’ IEEE
Syst. J., vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 128–139, Mar. 2017.
[8] B. Liu et al., ‘‘Infrastructure-assisted message dissemination for support-
ing heterogeneous driving patterns,’’ IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.,
vol. 18, no. 10, pp. 2865–2876, Oct. 2017.
[9] L. Wu, J. Wang, K. R. Choo, and D. He, ‘‘Secure key agreement and
key protection for mobile device user authentication,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 319–330, Feb. 2019.
[10] Q. Jiang, M. K. Khan, X. Lu, J. Ma, and D. He, ‘‘A privacy preserving
three-factor authentication protocol for e-health clouds,’’ J. Supercomput.,
vol. 72, no. 10, pp. 3826–3849, 2016.
[11] Q. Jiang, J. Ma, X. Lu, and Y. Tian, ‘‘An efficient two-factor user authenti-
cation scheme with unlinkability for wireless sensor networks,’’ Peer-Peer
Netw. Appl., vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 1070–1081, Jun. 2014.
[12] Q. Jiang, J. Ma, G. Li, and X. Li, ‘‘Improvement of robust smart-card-
based password authentication scheme,’’ Int. J. Commun. Syst., vol. 28,
no. 2, pp. 383–393, 2015.
[13] Y. Xie, L. Wu, N. Kumar, and J. Shen, ‘‘Analysis and improvement of
a privacy-aware handover authentication scheme for wireless network,’’
Wireless Pers. Commun., vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 523–541, 2017.
[14] L. Wu, Y. Xia, Z. Wang, and H. Wang, ‘‘Be stable and fair:
Robust data scheduling for vehicular networks,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 6,
pp. 32839–32849, 2018.
[15] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, and J.-P. Hubaux, ‘‘Securing vehicular com-
munications,’’ IEEEWireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 8–15, Oct. 2006.
[16] P. Porambage, C. Schmitt, P. Kumar, A. Gurtov, and M. Ylianttila, ‘‘Two-
phase authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks in distributed
iot applications,’’ in Proc. IEEE Wireless Commun. Netw. Conf. (WCNC),
Apr. 2014, pp. 2728–2733.
[17] R. Lu, X. Lin, H. Zhu, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, ‘‘ECPP: Efficient condi-
tional privacy preservation protocol for secure vehicular communications,’’
in Proc. IEEE 27th Conf. Comput. Commun. (INFOCOM), Apr. 2008,
pp. 1229–1237.
[18] J. Freudiger, M. Raya, M. Félegyházi, P. Papadimitratos, and J.-P. Hubaux,
‘‘Mix-zones for location privacy in vehicular networks,’’ in Proc. ACM
Workshop Wireless Netw. Intell. Transp. Syst. (WiN-ITS), 2007, pp. 1–7.
[19] C. Zhang, X. Lin, R. Lu, and P.-H. Ho, ‘‘RAISE: An efficient RSU-aided
message authentication scheme in vehicular communication networks,’’ in
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun., May 2008, pp. 1451–1457.
[20] J. Zhang and Y. Xu, ‘‘Privacy-preserving authentication protocols with
efficient verification in VANETs,’’ Int. J. Commun. Syst., vol. 27, no. 12,
pp. 3676–3692, 2014.
[21] A. Studer, E. Shi, F. Bai, and A. Perrig, ‘‘TACKing together effi-
cient authentication, revocation, and privacy in VANETs,’’ in Proc. 6th
Annu. IEEE Commun. Soc. Conf. Sensor, Mesh Ad Hoc Commun. Netw.
(SECON), Jun. 2009, pp. 1–9.
[22] L.-Y. Yeh, Y.-C. Chen, and J.-L. Huang, ‘‘PAACP: A portable
privacy-preserving authentication and access control protocol in vehicular
ad hoc networks,’’ Comput. Commun., vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 447–456, 2011.
[23] Y. Zhou, X. Zhao, Y. Jiang, F. Shang, S. Deng, and X.Wang, ‘‘An enhanced
privacy-preserving authentication scheme for vehicle sensor networks,’’
Sensors, vol. 17, no. 12, p. 2854, 2017.
[24] C. Zhang, R. Lu, X. Lin, P.-H. Ho, and X. Shen, ‘‘An efficient
identity-based batch verification scheme for vehicular sensor networks,’’
in Proc. 27th Conf. Comput. Commun. (INFOCOM), Apr. 2008, pp. 246–
250.
[25] C. Zhang, P.-H. Ho, and J. Tapolcai, ‘‘On batch verification with group
testing for vehicular communications,’’ Wireless Netw., vol. 17, no. 8,
pp. 1851–1865, 2011.
[26] M. C. Chuang and J. F. Lee, ‘‘TEAM: Trust-extended authentication
mechanism for vehicular ad hoc networks,’’ IEEE Syst. J., vol. 8, no. 3,
pp. 749–758, Sep. 2014.
[27] J. Bonneau, ‘‘The science of guessing: Analyzing an anonymized corpus
of 70 million passwords,’’ in Proc. IEEE Symp. Secur. Privacy (SP),
May 2012, pp. 538–552.
[28] M. Bellare, D. Pointcheval, and P. Rogaway, ‘‘Authenticated key exchange
secure against dictionary attacks,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Theory Appl. Cryp-
tograph. Techn. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2000, pp. 139–155.
[29] Rational Arithmetic C++ Library, MIRACL, London, U.K., 2013.
[30] M. Azees, P. Vijayakumar, and L. J. Deboarh, ‘‘EAAP: Efficient anony-
mous authentication with conditional privacy-preserving scheme for vehic-
ular ad hoc networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst., vol. 18, no. 9,
pp. 2467–2476, Sep. 2017.
[31] S. H. Islam, M. S. Obaidat, P. Vijayakumar, E. Abdulhay, F. Li, and
M. K. C. Reddy, ‘‘A robust and efficient password-based conditional
privacy preserving authentication and group-key agreement protocol for
VANETs,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 84, pp. 216–227, Jul. 2018.
[32] P. Vijayakumar, V. Chang, L. J. Deborah, B. Balusamy, and
P. G. Shynu, ‘‘Computationally efficient privacy preserving anonymous
mutual and batch authentication schemes for vehicular ad hoc networks,’’
Future Generat. Comput. Syst., vol. 78, pp. 943–955, Jan. 2016.
LIBING WU received the B.S. andM.S. degrees in
computer science fromCentral China Normal Uni-
versity, Wuhan, China, in 1994 and 2001, respec-
tively, and the Ph.D. degree in computer science
from Wuhan University, China, in 2006, where
he is currently a Professor with the School of
Computer Science. His areas of research inter-
ests include distributed computing, trusted soft-
ware, and wireless sensor networks. He is a Senior
Member of the CCF.
55062 VOLUME 7, 2019
L. Wu et al.: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Mutual Authentication Scheme for Secure V2V Communication in VANETs
QIANQIAN SUN is currently pursuing the mas-
ter’s degree in cyberspace security. Her research
interests include wireless networks, vehicular
ad-hoc networks, cryptography, and information
security.
XINPEI WANG is currently pursuing the master’s
degree. His research interests include computer
software and theory.
JING WANG received the B.S. degrees in com-
puter science from Wuhan University, Wuhan,
China, in 2016, where she is currently pursuing
the Ph.D. degree with the School of Computer
Science. Her main research interests include cryp-
tography and information security; in particular,
secure cloud storage and cryptographic protocols.
SHUI YU is currently a Full Professor with
the School of Software, University of Technol-
ogy Sydney, Australia. He has published two
monographs and has edited two books, over
200 technical papers, including top journals and
top conferences, such as the IEEE TPDS, TC,
TIFS, TMC, TKDE, TETC, ToN, and INFOCOM.
His research interests include security and privacy,
networking, big data, andmathematicalmodelling.
YIFEI ZOU received the B.E. degree from Com-
puter School, Wuhan University, in 2016. He is
currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the
Department of Computer Science, The Univer-
sity of Hong Kong. His research interests include
wireless networks, vehicular ad-hoc networks, and
distributed computing.
BINGYI LIU received the B.Sc. degree in com-
puter science from the Wuhan Institute of Tech-
nology, Wuhan, China, in 2011. He is currently
pursuing the Ph.D. degree under a joint program
with the Department of Computer Science, Wuhan
University, Wuhan, and the Department of Com-
puter Science, City University of Hong Kong,
Hong Kong. His research interests include wire-
less networks, vehicular ad-hoc networks, and the
Internet of Things.
ZIKE ZHU, photograph and biography not available at the time of
publication.
VOLUME 7, 2019 55063
